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Introduction
The papers in this volume were presented at the conference Philosophy 
of Linguistics and Language held at the IUC in Dubrovnik, September 
2015. A day of the conference was dedicated to the discussion of Ernie 
Lepore and Matthew Stone’s book Convention and Imagination thus 
the fi rst three contributions directly address different points in the men-
tioned book.
First Ernie Lepore and Matthew Stone give their “Précis of Imagi-
nation and Convention” where they give an overview of the arguments 
presented in their book and explain how ideas from the book continue 
to inform their ongoing work. One theme that they stress is the chal-
lenge of fully accounting for the linguistic rules that guide interpreta-
tion. They do this by attending to principles of discourse coherence and 
the many aspects of meaning that are linguistically encoded but are not 
truth-conditional in nature. Thus they argue that they get a much more 
constrained picture of context sensitivity in language than philosophers 
have typically assumed. The other theme is the heterogeneous nature of 
interpretive processes where they propose that the connotations of an ut-
terance are often best explained in terms of the hearer’s experiential en-
gagement with language, without appeal to propositional content that 
the speaker somehow signals either semantically or pragmatically.
In their article “Against Lepore and Stone’s Sceptic Account of Meta-
phorical Meaning” Esther Romero and Belén Soria discuss and criti-
cally assess Lepore and Stone’s account of metaphor. They claim that 
this account is based on three of Davidson’s proposals: (i) the rejection 
of metaphorical meanings; (ii) the rejection of metaphors as conveying 
metaphorical propositional contents; and (iii) the defence of analogy as 
the key mechanism for understanding metaphors. Lepore and Stone de-
fend these proposals because of the non-sceptic strategy on metaphorical 
meanings while Romero and Soria show not only how their non-sceptic 
account of metaphorical  meaning as a variety of ad hoc concept elimi-
nates diffi culties but also how it can solve related diffi culties in Lepore 
and Stone’s approach.
Daniel Harris in his paper “Intentionalism versus The New Conven-
tionalism” asks the question: Are the properties of communicative acts 
grounded in the intentions with which they are performed, or in the 
conventions that govern them? Ernie Lepore and Matthew Stone argue 
that much more of communication is conventional than we thought, and 
that the rest is not really communication, but merely the initiation of 
open-ended imaginative thought. Harris argues that although Lepore 
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and Stone may be right about many of the specifi c cases they discuss, 
conventionalist conclusions do not necessary follow.
Marilynn Johnson’s paper “Cooperation With Multiple Audiences” 
is not the direct discussion of Lepore and Stone’s book. She critically 
approaches Steven Pinker’s proposal of a game-theoretic framework to 
help explain the use of veiled speech in contexts where the ultimate aims 
of the speaker and hearer may diverge—such as a case of bribing a po-
lice offi cer to get out of a ticket. Pinker’s proposal is a seeming failure 
in H. P. Grice’s infl uential theory of meaning to recognize that speakers 
and hearers are not always cooperating. Johnson argues that Pinker 
mischaracterizes Grice’s views on cooperation and then argues that the 
cases Pinker presents are best treated by recognizing that in each in-
stance the utterance is formulated with two intentions towards two dif-
ferent audiences. Johnson then goes on to detail a resulting revision to 
Pinker’s game-theoretic framework that refl ects this proposal.
Jessica Keiser in her paper “Coordinating with Language” looks into 
the idea that linguistic meaning is determined by use pointing to the 
fact that this claim marks the point where metasemantic inquiry begins 
rather than where it ends. It sets an agenda for the metasemantic proj-
ect: to distinguish, in a principled and explanatory way, those uses that 
determine linguistic meaning from those that do not. The prevailing 
view (along with its various refi nements), which privileges assertion, 
suffers from being at once overly liberal and overly idealized. By pars-
ing the most prominent aims we use language to achieve, noting their 
relations of dependence and the specifi c type of uses they involve, she 
arrives at a novel metasemantic account: facts of linguistic meaning are 
determined by locutionary action.
Marco Ruffi no’s contribution “Superfi cially and Deeply Contingent 
A Priori Truths” reviews some standard approaches to the cases of con-
tingent a priori truths that emerge from Kripke’s (1980) discussion of 
proper names and Kaplan’s (1989) theory of indexicals. In particular, 
he discusses Evans’ (1979) distinction between superfi cially and deeply 
contingent truths. He raises doubts about Evans’ strategy in general, 
and also about the roots and meaningfulness of the distinction.
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